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ABSTRACT
Advocates of teacher incentive programs argue that they can strengthen weak incentives, while
opponents argue they lead to “teaching to the test.” We find evidence that existing teacher incentives
in Kenya are indeed weak, with teachers absent 20% of the time.  We then report on a randomized
evaluation of a program that provided primary school teachers in rural Kenya with incentives based
on students' test scores. Students in program schools had higher test scores, significantly so on at
least some exams, during the time the program was in place. An examination of the channels through
which this effect took place, however, provides little evidence of more teacher effort aimed at
increasing long-run learning. Teacher attendance did not improve, homework assignment did not
increase, and pedagogy did not change. There is, however, evidence that teachers increased effort
to raise short-run test scores by conducting more test preparation sessions. While students in
treatment schools scored higher than their counterparts in comparison schools during the life of the
program, they did not retain these gains after the end of the program, consistent with the hypothesis
that teachers focused on manipulating short-run scores. In order to discourage dropouts, students
who did not test were assigned low scores.  Program schools had the same dropout rate as
comparison schools, but a higher percentage of students in program schools took the test.
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Teacher incentive programs have enjoyed growing popularity. In the United States, a 
number of teacher incentive programs have been introduced in the past decade, generally 
offering annual merit pay on the order of 10% to 40% of an average teacher’s monthly salary 
(American Federation of Teachers, 2000).
1Under the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) act, passed 
in 2001, poorly performing schools face sanctions across the United States. Israel has provided 
incentives to teachers based on students’ scores (Lavy 2002a, b) and a World Bank program in 
Mexico will provide performance incentives to primary school teachers. 
Advocates of incentive pay for teachers note that teachers currently face weak incentives, 
with pay determined almost entirely by educational attainment, training, and experience, rather 
than performance (Harbison and Hanushek, 1992; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin, 1998; Hanushek, 
1996; Lockheed and Verspoor, 1991), and argue that linking teachers’ pay to students’ 
performance would increase teacher effort.
Opponents of test score-based incentives argue that since teachers' tasks are multi-
dimensional and only some aspects are measured by test scores, linking compensation to test 
scores could cause teachers to sacrifice promoting curiosity and creative thinking in order to 
teach skills tested on standardized exams (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Hannaway, 1992). 
In many developing countries, incentives for teachers are even weaker than in developed 
countries. Thus, for example, in our data teachers are absent from school 20% of the time and 
absent from their classrooms even more frequently. Work in progress suggests that absence rates 
among primary-school teachers are 26% in Uganda, 23% in India, 16% in Ecuador and 13% in 
Peru.  (Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, and Rogers, 2003).
                                               
1 Examples include programs in Rhode Island in 1999, Denver in 1999-2000, Douglas County, Colorado beginning 
in 1994 and Iowa beginning in 2001 (Olsen, 1999; Education Commission of the States, 2000). A 1999 program in 
California offered a one-time award of $25,000 to teachers in under-performing schools whose students showed 
substantial gains (Olsen, 1999).2
In environments with very weak incentives, it could be argued that the key problem is to 
get teachers to show up at all. Given that most teaching in many developing countries is by rote, 
the risk of reducing efforts to stimulate creativity may seem remote. On the other hand, if 
incentive systems are very weak, schools could potentially respond to test score-based incentives 
in more pernicious ways than teaching to the test. For example, they could deliberately force 
students to repeat grades or even drop out in order to raise average scores on the exam.  
This paper examines the issue of teacher incentives in Kenya, where some local school 
committees strengthen teacher incentives by providing bonuses to teachers whose students 
perform well on exams. We report on a randomized evaluation of a program along these lines 
that provided incentives to teachers in 50 rural schools based on the average test score of 
students already enrolled at the start of the program. Students who did not take the test were 
assigned very low scores so as to discourage dropouts. Each year the program provided prizes 
valued at up to 43% of typical monthly salary to teachers in grades 4 to 8 based on the 
performance of the school as a whole on the Kenyan government's district-wide exams. This 
ratio of prize to salary was similar to that used in typical U.S. incentive programs. 
During the life of the program, students in treatment schools were more likely to take 
exams, and scored higher, at least on some exams. An examination of the channels through 
which this effect took place, however, provides little evidence of more teacher effort aimed at 
preventing dropouts or increasing long-run learning. Dropout rates did not fall, teacher 
attendance did not improve, homework assignment did not increase, and pedagogy did not 
change. There is, however, evidence that teachers increased efforts to increase the number of 
pupils taking tests in the short run and to raise short-run test scores. Conditional on being 
enrolled, students in treatment schools were more likely to take tests, and teachers in treatment 
schools were more likely to conduct test preparation sessions. While students in treatment 
schools scored higher than their counterparts in comparison schools during the two years that the 3
program operated, they did not retain these gains after the end of the program, consistent with a 
model in which teachers focused on manipulating short-run scores. 
There is evidence that teachers learned how to adjust to the system over time. Test 
preparation sessions increased from the first to the second year of the program, as did the gap 
between treatment and comparison schools in exam participation rates and overall test scores.
1.1 Related Literature
A number of earlier papers examine the impact of linking teacher pay to students' test 
scores.  Lavy (2002a) finds that an Israeli program providing teachers individual cash prizes for 
increases in student test scores on a high-school matriculation exam increased high school 
matriculation exam rates from 42% to 45.3%. At 60% to 300% of the average monthly salary, 
the prizes given in this case were much larger than those in most teacher incentive programs in 
the U.S.  Lavy (2002b) finds that rewarding Israeli teachers based on school average 
performance (rather than individual performance) increased test scores and participation in 
matriculation exams, but not the percentage of students receiving matriculation certificates.
Jacob (2002) explores a Chicago program in which students with low test scores were not 
promoted to the next grade and schools and teachers were put on probation. He finds that the 
program increased student achievement, although the improvement was larger in skill sets used 
on the high-stakes exam. Some schools manipulated scores by putting more students in special 
education classes. Figlio and Winicki (2002) show that school districts in Virginia increase the 
number of calories in school lunches on days when high-stakes tests are administered, thus 
artificially inflating test scores. 
This paper differs from earlier work in several ways. First, since both advocates and 
opponents of teacher incentive programs agree that incentives can increase test scores, but 4
disagree about whether these higher test scores would be due to increased overall teacher effort 
or more teaching to the test, we measure not only how teacher incentives affect test scores, but 
also how they affect different types of teacher effort. In particular, we examine teacher behavior 
in the classroom and scores not only on exams to which incentives were linked, but also on other 
exams given both contemporaneously with the program and after its conclusion.  Second, since 
teacher incentive programs are likely to be introduced in areas where teacher performance is 
worse than expected, and since the introduction of teacher incentives may be correlated with 
other factors affecting teacher performance, it is difficult to econometrically identify the effect of 
such teacher incentive programs. We address this problem by examining a context with random 
assignment of schools to treatment and comparison groups. Third, we examine teacher incentives 
in a developing country context.
2Finally, by collecting panel data on teacher absence, we are 
able to show that teacher absence is widespread, suggesting existing incentives are weak in the 
context we examine. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches a simple 
Holmstrom-Milgrom style model in which linking bonuses to test scores could potentially either 
increase teaching effort or divert effort towards teaching to the test. Section 3 discusses primary 
education in Kenya and argues that the high rate of teacher absence suggests current incentives 
are inadequate. Section 4 describes the teacher incentives program that we examined, and the 
process by which schools were selected for the program. Section 5 reports the impact of the 
program on teacher outcomes, while Section 6 reports the impact on student outcomes. Section 7 
discusses how teacher behavior changed in response to incentives over time, and Section 8 
concludes. 
                                               
2 Kingdon and Teal (2002) show that in private schools in India teacher pay and student achievement are linked, but 
they do not demonstrate specifically that linking pay to performance has any effect.5
2. A Model of Productive and Signaling Effort
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) consider a model in which linking pay to observable 
signals of performance can potentially lead employees to focus on tasks for which output is 
easily measured and divert effort away from tasks for which output is difficult to measure. They 
motivate their analysis using two main examples. In the first, linking teacher pay to test scores 
may cause teachers to teach to the test rather than encourage creativity. In the second, employees 
who are responsible both for producing output and for maintaining the value of an underlying 
asset, such as a piece of equipment or a firm’s reputation, may neglect the long run value of the 
asset if they are provided with strong incentives to focus on current output. 
We consider a model that combines elements of both Holmstrom and Milgrom’s 
motivating examples, and can be considered a special case of their general model. Teachers can 
exert two types of effort: efforts to promote long-run learning and “signaling effort,” which 
improves scores in the short-run but has little effect on long-term learning. Employers observe 
only test scores. In particular, we assume test scores depend both on underlying learning 
(produced by teaching effort over time) and contemporaneous signaling effort. Suppose that 
, ) ( ...) , , ( 2 1 t t t t t t s e e e L T H J        where  t T denotes test scores during period t, L denotes student 
learning,  t e denotes teaching effort on long-run learning during period t, s denotes signaling 
effort, and H is a random shock. Thus, teaching effort produces long-run improvements in 
students' understanding, while signaling effort produces only short-run effects on test scores. 
(Teaching effort can thus be seen as unobservable effort to maintain asset value in Holmstrom 
and Milgrom’s framework.)
Assume that teachers' utility is given by  ) , ( s e C M U    where Mis teacher pay and C
is a utility cost that depends on both teaching and signaling effort. In this specification, e and s
can be either substitutes or complements. For example, they could be substitutes if there is a 6
fixed amount of time in the day that must be allocated between them. On the other hand, they 
could be complements if there is a fixed cost to teachers of attending school at all.
Suppose teacher pay is  BT M   D .  If  0   B , so pay is independent of performance, 
teachers will choose effort in teaching and signaling such that the marginal product of each is 
equal to zero.  As noted by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), C1 (0,0) and C2 (0,0) may be 
negative, so some effort may be exerted even if B = 0.  Teachers may care about their students, 
or enjoy exerting some effort even in the absence of performance incentives. 
If the government or an NGO makes a surprise announcement that pay will be linked to 
test scores for a single year, teachers will change both teaching and signaling effort to satisfy the 
first order conditions implied by the above equations.  Specifically, teachers will exert teaching 




















. If e and s are complements 
in the utility function, or if utility is additively separable, then both types of effort will increase. 
If they are substitutes in the utility function then incentives may increase one type of effort at the 
expense of the other. Thus in this model, incentives could potentially either increase or decrease 
teaching effort.
3
 In the model, if it were possible to cheaply and accurately monitor individual 
performance on both tasks as part of an incentive program, then a wage contract could induce 
teaching effort without inducing signaling effort. However, while distinguishing teaching and 
signaling effort would be expensive and inaccurate at the individual level, particularly if tied to 
an incentive program, there are potential ways to distinguish them empirically at the aggregate 
                                               
3 Clearly, there is a continuum between exerting effort on promoting long-term learning and trying to manipulate 
short-run test scores. The extreme of manipulating short-run scores would be actually cheating at the time of the test; 
less extreme versions would include going over questions from previous years’ exams, and teaching test-taking 
strategies such as guessing on multiple choice questions. Within the category of promoting learning, teachers could 
focus narrowly on the curriculum to be tested or could promote learning more broadly. One could imagine 
generalizing this model to allow teachers to choose from a menu of activities, with varying components of true and 
signaling effort, but results would presumably be similar.7
level, at least if results are not tied to compensation. First, outside observers may be able to 
observe teachers’ activities directly.  For example, in Kenya, some schools conduct what are 
known locally as “preps”—extra test preparation or coaching outside of normal class time, often 
during school vacations. One could potentially interpret preps as including a higher rate of 
signaling to teaching effort than ordinary classroom attendance. Second, improved learning 
should have a long-run effect on test scores, whereas under the model signaling has only a short-
run effect.
4 Thus a finding that test score gains do not persist is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the program led only to extra coaching specific to the test at hand. It is more difficult to 
reconcile this result with the hypothesis of increased long-run learning. A third potential way to 
distinguish efforts to increase long-run learning from test preparation activities is to check if test 
scores improved primarily in subjects prone to memorization.
Note that under the model, parents and local communities may not object to teachers’ 
investing in short-run test preparation, since students' prospects for further education and labor 
market success depend on test scores as well as underlying learning. Test preparation, however, 
is assumed to be socially wasteful, in that it requires teacher effort but does not improve the 
underlying learning that affects total output in society. 
3. Background 
This section provides some background on primary school teaching in Kenya and 
provides evidence that teacher absence is widespread in the area of the study. 
                                               
4 In practice some types of signaling may have a long-run effect on test scores.  For example, helping students cheat 
will only increase scores in the short run, but teaching students to guess on multiple choice exams or better allocate 
their time could raise scores on other tests and in the long run.8
Teacher hiring, firing, and transfer decisions in Kenya are made centrally by the Ministry 
of Education. Hiring is based primarily on academic qualifications.
5 Salaries are set through 
collective bargaining between the government and the politically powerful Kenyan National 
Union of Teachers (KNUT). In 1997, the starting salary for teachers was Ksh 5,175 ($88) per 
month, and a typical teacher in our sample earned approximately Ksh 7,000 ($119) per month.
6
Taking into account generous benefits, total teacher compensation was approximately $2,000 a 
year, or more than five times annual GDP per capita.
7
Teachers’ salaries depend primarily on education and experience. There is little 
opportunity for performance-based promotion or increases to salary. Teachers have strong civil 
service and union protection and are difficult to fire. In some cases teachers who have performed 
very badly are transferred to less desirable locations, while the government may look more 
favorably on requests for transfers to more desirable postings or to home areas from teachers 
who perform well. 
Although incentives provided to teachers by their employer are weak, every school is 
supposed to have a parent committee, and these committees sometimes provide gifts for teachers 
when schools perform well on the national exams. Similarly, communities sometimes refuse to 
allow exceptionally bad teachers to enter the school, thus putting pressure on the Ministry of 
Education to arrange a transfer for the teacher. However, only a minority of school committees 
provide supplemental bonuses, and school committees typically only attempt to influence the 
national authorities in extreme situations.
                                               
5 Primary school teachers in Kenya typically have completed two years of teacher training beyond secondary school.
A small number of teachers were hired under an older system in which primary teachers had only a 7
th grade 
education and two years of teacher training. 
6 This is assuming an exchange rate of 58.7 shillings per dollar, the 1997 dollar-shilling exchange rate. 
7 Authors' calculations based on value of housing allowance and other benefits. This is calculated from salary scales 
and represents a salary for a teacher with average education and experience in a sample of schools in the area. 9
To the extent that incentives do exist, they are typically based on the system of national 
testing. Results on the national primary school leaving exams (the KCPE) are front-page news in 
Kenya, and newspapers publish the relative positions of different districts in the country on the 
national exam and lists of the highest-scoring schools. Results from this exam and from district 
exams administered in the upper grades of primary school are often posted in headmasters’ 
offices. Since the primary school leaving exam determines what secondary schools, if any, will 
accept graduating primary school students, teachers devote considerable effort to preparing for 
these exams. An important method of preparation is to review books of questions from old 
exams. Some schools hold extra preparation sessions for the exams outside of normal class 
hours.  These sessions – locally referred to as “preps” – are held during evenings, weekends or 
vacation periods.  These sessions are made up of a variety of activities, ranging from class-work 
similar to normal classroom sessions to direct test preparation activities like going over old 
exams.  In general, these sessions will be more heavily weighted to specific test-preparation 
activities than normal classroom sessions. 
While the considerable attention given to results on national exams clearly spurs effort by 
some teachers to raise their scores, not all of this effort is necessarily desirable. For example, 
seventh graders who do not perform well are often required to repeat a grade rather than being 
allowed to go on to 8
th grade and take the KCPE exam. 
One indication that teacher incentives are weak lies in high absence rates. Random visits 
conducted to check pupil attendance and observe pedagogy suggest that teachers in comparison 
schools were absent about 20% of the time. While the 20% absence rate may reflect a variety of 
factors, including the prevalence of infectious diseases such as malaria and AIDS, these 
unavoidable absences are unlikely to account for all absences.  For comparison, absence rates 
among staff at a non-profit organization working in the same area are around 6.3%.  10
Absences seem fairly broadly distributed among the population of teachers rather than 
primarily accounted for by a subset of teachers with very high absence rates.  To see this, it is 
helpful to consider the empirical distribution of absences, as well as two ways of calibrating the 
underlying distribution of absences across teachers that correct for the additional dispersion in 
absence rates across teachers that is created by sampling error.  
Figure 1 and Table 1 show the percentage of teachers who were absent zero times out of 
eight visits, one time out of eight visits, twice out of eight visits, and so on.  However, it is 
important to note that with only a few visits to each school, the dispersion of absence rates in the 
empirical distribution will exaggerate the underlying dispersion of probabilities of attendance 
among teachers. For example, suppose there were only two visits, and that one  quarter of 
teachers were absent on both visits, half were absent once, and a quarter were present during 
both visits. Note that this hypothetical data would be consistent with the hypothesis that all 
teachers attend half the time but is inconsistent with the hypothesis that a quarter of the teachers 
have a zero probability of absence, half attend half of the time, and one quarter are always 
present. In general, due to sampling error, the variance of empirically observed absence rates 
across teachers will be greater than the underlying variance of probabilities of absence. As the 
number of visits to each school increases, the empirical distribution of observed teacher absence 
rates converges to the underlying distribution.
To correct for this problem and assess the extent to which teacher absences are 
concentrated, we calibrate two more structural models of absences.
8  The first is a non-
parametric model in which we assume the population of teachers consists of 5 groups, with 
proportions D1 through D5 and probabilities of attendance p1 through p5. There are nine 
independent unknowns in this model: D1 … D4 and p1 … p5. The model is therefore identified 
                                               
8 We are grateful to Emily Oster for outstanding work calibrating these two models.11
with eight visits, since this gives nine possible outcomes (ranging from never attending to 
attending at all visits). We observe a proportion x0 of teachers who are never present, x1 who are 
present once, and so on. We solve a system of equations in which the expected proportion of 
teachers present for J<8 visits (based on D1 … D4 and p1…p5) is set equal to the actual proportion 
xJ. The resulting group size and attendance probabilities are graphed in Figure 1 and detailed in 
Table 1.  The median teacher in this model is absent about 19% of the time. 
The second model imposes more structure, but allows for a continuous distribution of the 
probability of attendance.  For this model we assume that each teacher’s probability of attending 
p that is drawn from a beta distribution,
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The beta distribution of attendance probabilities implied by the ML estimates of D and E
is graphed in Figure 1 and detailed in Table 1. The median teacher is absent about 14% of the 
time in this calibration.  
Both models yield similar results. Although a few teachers are rarely present, the 
majority of absences appear to be due to those who attend between 50% and 80% of the time. In 12
addition, in both models (although more so in the beta distribution model) a large minority of 
absence is actually due to those who attend more than 80% of the time, as can be seen in Table 1. 
The widespread nature of absences suggests that teachers who are absent frequently may 
not be violating a social norm. This is not, however, an implicit contract in which the 
government pays teachers only for part-time work. As noted above, including benefits, Kenyan 
teachers are paid up to 5 times average per capita income.  There is substantial unemployment 
among people who would be qualified to become teachers and queuing for teaching jobs. The 
government imposed a hiring freeze in 1998 so several cohorts of graduates of teacher training 
colleges are unemployed. Some are working for free in the hope of eventually obtaining a paying 
job. 
Further evidence of weak incentives is that while teachers are absent from school about 
20% of the time, they are absent from their classroom much more often. In 1998, the time of 
teacher arrival was not recorded during classroom visits to observe pedagogy, but in 1999, when 
it was, 45% of the time teachers never arrived in the classroom. 
Recalling the model in Section 2, the fact that we have information on both teacher 
attendance and preps provides us the opportunity to run a simple regression of test scores on 
teacher attendance and test preparations sessions.  To the extent that one is willing to interpret 
this causally, this regression suggests that the marginal product of test preparation sessions, 
which can plausibly be interpreted as signaling effort, may be much higher than that of teacher 
attendance, a plausible measure of teacher effort.
9 The evidence, based on visits conducted in 
1998, suggests that teachers who attend school 20 percentage points more of the time have 
students who score 0.0115 standard deviations higher (standard error 0.0123).
10  We do not have 
                                               
9 Data on teacher attendance and test scores are described below.
10 Note, however, that these estimates will be subject to attenuation bias since teacher attendance is estimated based 
on random visits and thus measured with substantial error.13
information on exactly how long teachers spent on coaching, but only know whether they taught 
during each of the three vacation periods over the year or outside of normal school hours during 
each of the three terms.  However, those who report coaching in one additional time period have 
pupils who score 0.044 standard deviations higher (standard error 0.0087).  It is somewhat 
difficult to draw conclusions about the relative marginal productivity of coaching and teaching 
given that we do not have data on how many days of coaching took place.  Based on discussions 
with teachers about the frequency of coaching, however, it seems likely that, if interpreted 
causally, our point estimates would imply that the marginal test score effect of a day of coaching 
is an order of magnitude or more greater than that of a day of school attendance.
Of course, it is not clear that these correlations should be interpreted causally. 
Nonetheless, the hypothesis that test preparation activities can raise test scores is consistent with 
evidence from the U.S. on the effects of commercial test preparation. These studies often show 
gains of 0.15 to 0.4 standard deviations on admissions tests, even though most U.S. admission 
tests are supposed to measure aptitude, rather than achievement, and thus to be difficult to study 
for. Extra coaching raised scores on an achievement test by 0.25 standard deviations (Bangert-
Drowns et al.,1983). In an environment in which teacher pay is not linked to test scores, it seems 
plausible that teachers might make only limited efforts at test preparation, leaving the marginal 
test score product of test preparation substantially greater than that of teacher attendance.
The hypothesis that the marginal test score impact of a day of preps is larger than a day of 
teaching is reasonable if one assumes that incentives are initially weak.  Denote e0 and s0 as the 
levels of e and s when B=0.  It seems reasonable that teachers’ utility from putting in teaching 
effort may be greater than their utility from signaling (although there may be some benefit from 
signaling if it enhances the teacher’s reputation with students and parents).  If this is true, then 












As noted above, some school committees in Kenya provide bonuses to teachers whose 
students perform well in exams. This paper evaluates a program conducted by International 
Christelijk Steunfonds (ICS), a Dutch NGO, in Busia and Teso Districts of Western Kenya. The 
program offered schools the opportunity to provide gifts to teachers if students performed well. It 
provided prizes to teachers in grades 4 to 8 based on the performance of the school as a whole on 
the district exams in each year. All teachers who taught these grades were eligible for the prize.
11
ICS awarded prizes in two categories: "Top-scoring schools" and "Most-improved 
schools." Schools could not win in more than one category. Improvements were calculated 
relative to performance in the baseline year. Since the results of the district exams were not 
available for 1997, the scores for 1996 were used as the base to measure improvements. 
(Henceforth, we will refer to the last pre-program year for which we have data as year 0,
12 the 
first (1998) and second (1999) years of the program as years 1 and 2 respectively, and the post-
program year (2000) as year 3.) In each category, three first prizes were awarded, three second 
prizes were awarded, three third prizes were awarded, and three fourth prizes were awarded. 
Thus, overall, 24 out of the 50 schools participating in the program received prizes of some type, 
and teachers in most schools should have felt that they had a chance of winning a prize. Since 
Busia and Teso Districts had separate district exams, prizes were offered separately in each 
district in proportion to the number of schools in the district. 
Education experts generally are more sympathetic to school-based incentives than to 
individual-based incentives since they feel these are more conducive to cooperation among 
teachers (Richards and Sheu, 1992; Hanushek, 1996).  In order to encourage cooperation among 
                                               
11 Teachers of lower grades were not a part of the competition, because there were no district exams for those 
classes. They received a lantern as a token prize, whether or not they belonged to a winning school15
teachers within schools and to avoid creating incentives for teachers to sabotage each other's 
work, ICS prizes were based on the performance of all of the grade 4 to 8 pupils in the school, 
with each subject weighted equally, rather than on a teacher-by-teacher basis. Thus, every 
teacher in grades 4 to 8 in the winning schools received the same prize. Setting prizes at the 
school level could potentially allow free-riding within the teaching staff. However, teachers are 
in a relatively good position to monitor each other's performance, particularly on easily observed 
aspects such as attendance. Moreover, since teachers can observe each other's work at high 
frequency, they were in a repeated game with each other. Since the typical school in the sample 
had only 200 students and 12 teachers, about half of whom taught in the upper grades, teachers 
should have been able to enforce cooperation within the school.
In order to discourage schools from forcing weaker students to repeat, drop out, or not 
take the exam, students who did not take the exam were assigned low scores. Multiple choice 
exams were used in all subjects other than English. Students who did not take these exams were 
assigned a score of 15, whereas students who simply guessed would have obtained a score of 25 
on average. On the English essay exam component, students who did not take the test were 
assigned a score of zero. In order to discourage schools from recruiting strong students to take 
the exams, only students enrolled in school as of February 1998 were included in the 
computation of the school mean score.
Prizes ranged in value from 21 to 43% of typical teacher monthly salaries.
13 This is 
comparable to merit pay programs in the United States. For example, the 1993-94 Dallas merit 
pay program, which was also based on school-wide performance, awarded $1000 annual 
bonuses, which were 39% of an average monthly salary of Texas teachers that year, and 
presumably a somewhat lower percentage of salaries for teachers in Dallas (Clotfelter and Ladd, 
                                                                                                                                                      
12 This may be either 1996 or 1997 depending on the type of data.16
1996; American Federation of Teachers, 2000). Similarly, a 1999 Rhode Island program 
awarded $1,000 annual bonuses, worth about 25% of monthly salary (Olsen, 1999; American 
Federation of Teachers, 2000). Other programs in Colorado award between 10% and 50% of 
monthly salary in merit-based annual bonuses (Education Commission of the States, 2001).
Schools were offered the opportunity to participate in this program in February 1998 and 
all accepted. (The academic year in Kenya runs from January to November.) The prizes were 
awarded during a ceremony held in November of each year, and all the schools in the program 
were invited to attend. In order to discourage teachers from arranging transfers into treatment 
schools in order to be eligible for the program, eligibility was restricted to teachers who were 
employed in the school as of March 1998. As discussed below, teacher entry and exit rates did 
not differ significantly between treatment and comparison schools. 
When the program was originally announced in February 1998, it was scheduled to run 
for a single year and teachers were informed of this. Later the program was extended for an 
additional year. Because the NGO had conducted other programs in the area, we think most 
teachers found the commitment to provide the prizes credible. However, it is possible that 
teachers did not react fully to the program until after they had actually seen the prizes awarded 
during the first year. The awards ceremony presumably increased the salience of the program. It 
is not clear whether teachers expected the program to continue longer than the NGO had 
promised, since the NGO tries to be conservative in announcing benefits it will provide to avoid 
creating overly high expectations. 
The short duration of the program and its surprise introduction allowed several elements 
to be included that might not otherwise have been possible in a permanent program. Half the 
prizes were based on improvements in performance. Teachers in many lower performing schools 
                                                                                                                                                      
13 Each winning school also received a briefcase for the headmaster, a wall clock, a time keeping clock, and a bell.17
may have felt these were the only prizes for which they could realistically compete. The 
incentives created by these prizes for improvement were presumably larger than they would have 
been in a permanent program in which teachers who increased their scores in one year would 
find it harder to win the prize in subsequent years. Moreover, the short duration of the program 
made it possible to base prizes on the test scores of all students originally enrolled in the school, 
which allowed the program to discourage repetition and dropouts. Under a permanent program, 
schools might have incentives to restrict admissions to school to students who they believe 
would score well on exams. Similarly, the program was restricted to the original teachers at this 
school. It thus reduced the opportunity for teachers to seek assignment to schools with high-
scoring pupils due to non-teacher factors such as parental characteristics. All these factors imply 
that the incentives provided by the program were stronger than could have been provided with 
the same expenditure under a permanent program. On the other hand, teachers might have had 
stronger incentives to promote long-run learning if they expected the program to continue 
indefinitely. 
Overall, the context seems particularly favorable for a teacher incentives program: the 
level of teacher absence suggests that teacher effort was an issue in schools; there was relatively 
little scope for diverting teacher attention away from creativity and towards teaching to the test; 
and the short duration of the program made possible a design that did not encourage 
manipulation of the student body or the set of teachers in the school.
4.1 School Selection
The 50 schools in the program were selected from a group of 100 schools that had 
originally been selected by the Ministry of Education because they were considered to be 
particularly in need of assistance, but had not participated in an earlier World Bank program 
which provided textbooks to the schools judged to be in greatest need. These schools scored 18
somewhat worse than average for the area before ICS began working with them. ICS had 
provided textbooks or modest grants to these schools before the inception of the teacher 
incentive program. Schools were numbered according to the year they received textbooks or 
grants from ICS, their geographic division, and their alphabetical order.  Within each group, the 
odd numbered schools were chosen to participate in the teacher incentive program. By 
construction, the odd and even numbered schools were split in comparable proportions across 
Busia and Teso districts, geographic divisions within these districts, and across schools which 
received textbooks and grants in different years.
The 50 even-numbered schools that serve as the comparison group for this evaluation 
participated in another program that was designed to improve pre-schools by providing training, 
materials, and salary supplements conditional on pre-school teacher attendance. Pre-school 
teachers, unlike the primary school teachers, are semi-volunteers who are not hired or paid by the 
central Ministry of Education, but instead are hired locally by parents' committees and receive 
only contributions from parents, which are often irregular. Unlike primary school teachers, pre-
school teachers often have no formal training and do not belong to the Kenya teachers union. 
Since pre-school and primary school teachers are quite distinct, and since in any case the pre-
school program had little effect on performance in the pre-school classes, it seems unlikely that 
this program affected outcomes in grades 4 to 8 during the time period we examine. 
5. Impact of Incentives on Teachers
This section examines the impact of the program on teacher behavior by comparing 
outcomes between treatment and comparison schools. It is worth noting, however, that 
interviews of teachers in treatment schools about their satisfaction with the program suggest that 
teachers in participating schools liked the program. In particular, in the middle of the second year 
of the incentives program, the headmaster and three other teachers were interviewed in each 19
program school. All teachers interviewed supported the idea of motivating teachers by providing 
them with incentives. Most reported a change in school activities and teacher attitudes because of 
the program. 83% reported that prizes were justly awarded in 1998. 75% of teachers in program 
schools reported an increase in homework assignment due to the program, 67% reported an 
increase in cooperation among teachers, and 88% reported an increase in preps. 
5.1 Teacher Assignment
The incentives program was designed so as not to provide incentives for teachers to join 
program schools. Only teachers who were already assigned to an incentive school as of March of 
the first year were eligible for a prize. However, the program could potentially have reduced the 
exit rate of teachers from the incentive schools. 
In fact, the exit rate was not significantly different between program and comparison 
schools (Table 2, Columns 1 and 2).
14 The entry rate was higher in the incentive schools for the 
first year of the program, and lower for the second, although in neither case was the difference 
statistically significant (Table 2, Columns 3 and 4).
15
We also considered the possibility that teachers in treatment schools in lower grades 
would attempt to transfer into teaching higher grades, even though this would not actually make 
them eligible for the program. There is no evidence of differential transfers across grades. In 
treatment schools 7.4% of teachers transfer from a non-incentive grade to an incentive grade 
during the program; in comparison schools 7.3% do. 
                                               
14  All regressions in this paper allow for school-level random effects to take account of the possibility that there 
may be correlation between error terms for students or teachers in the same school. Note that in the random effect 
regression framework the coefficient on the constant term is not exactly equal to the mean of the omitted category. 
15 The transfers include voluntary transfers due to family reasons (such as marriage) or involuntary transfers such as 
disciplinary actions against teachers or staff balancing needs (to replace teachers who retire, die, or move.)20
5.2 Teacher Attendance
Teacher attendance was not affected by the incentive program. In the year prior to the 
establishment of the program, each of the 100 schools was subject to two random, unannounced 
visits at which the present/absent status of each teacher in grades 4 to 8 was recorded. Similar 
visits were made five times in year 1 and three times in year 2.
16 For each teacher in each year, 
an attendance rate was computed as the proportion of visits during which the teacher was 
present. Note that teachers were recorded as present if they were at the school, even if they were 
not teaching when the visit took place. Following standard Intention-to-Treat (ITT) 
methodology, the sample included only those teachers who were assigned to program or 
comparison schools in year 0. Any teachers who changed schools between year 0 and year 1 or 
between year 1 and year 2 were classified with their initial schools.
17
Prior to the program, schools that would later be selected to be program schools have 
slightly higher teacher attendance, although the difference was insignificant (Table 3, Column 
1).
18 In year 1 of the program, teacher attendance was actually slightly lower in the incentive 
schools, and in year 2 the attendance was slightly higher in incentive schools (Table 3, columns 2 
and 3), although both coefficients are insignificant and quite small.
19
                                               
16 Some visits did not take place, for example due to vehicle breakdowns. 1.44 visits were made to the average 
school in year 0, 4.78 in year 1, and 2.95 in year 2.  We focus on teacher absence data based on visits to schools, 
rather than on official school logs, because school logs are often not filled out. However, school-log data also 
suggest no effect of the program on absence. 
17 This could only be done for those teachers who switched schools and remained in the sample of 100 schools. 
Since there are no data on the teachers who switched to other schools, they were dropped from the analysis.
18 The results here are robust to a specification in which each visit is treated as a binary opportunity for attendance 
and month of visit is controlled for.
19 Results are also similar when lower primary school teachers are used as a control in a regression in which 
attendance of all the teachers in the schools is regressed on a dummy for the program, on whether they are a lower 
primary teacher or an upper primary teacher, and on an interaction term.  21
5.3 Homework Assignment
For a random subset of students in grades 4 to 8 for each school, information was 
collected from the students on whether they were assigned any homework on the previous day.  
In general, homework assignment was much more common in the higher grades. In 1997, 14% 
of grade 4 students report having homework assigned the previous day, versus 45% of grade 8 
students.  Treatment schools assigned slightly more homework than comparison schools prior to 
the program, although the difference is far from significant (Table 4, Column 1). After the launch 
of the program, treatment schools assigned slightly less homework, although the gap was 
insignificant both in levels and in differences (Columns 2 and 3). 
5.4 Pedagogy
Teacher behavior was not significantly different between the incentive and comparison 
schools. Trained observers observed each teacher annually, spending one period in a class and 
recording teacher behavior on a number of measures, including both objective information about 
what the teacher was doing and subjective impressions about their energy level and caring for the 
students. We examined a wide variety of pedagogy measures, and the results for two objective 
measures (blackboard use and teaching aid use) and two subjective ones (teacher caring and 
energy) are presented here. 
There was no significant difference in pedagogy between the incentive and comparison 
schools for any of the classroom observations prior to the program (Table 5, Column 1). We also 
find no significant difference during the intervention period between the two school groups in 
any of the pedagogical practices (Columns 2 and 3). The point estimates are close to zero for 
each observation type. The difference-in-difference estimates shown in the last two columns 
were computed at the school-grade level since it was not possible to match individual teachers 
across observations years. These estimates are also close to zero for every observation type. 22
5.5 Test Preparation Sessions
Incentive schools conducted more preps than comparison schools. Headmasters in each 
school provided information on whether there were any preps for grades 4 through 8 in six time 
periods during the year – the three school vacations (April, August and December) and out of 
school hours during each of the three terms. 
Prior to the program, incentive schools were slightly less likely to offer preps (Table 6, 
Column 1), but after the introduction of the program, treatment schools started to conduct more 
preps (Columns 2 and 3). They were 4.2 percentage points more likely to conduct preps in the 
first year and 7.4 percentage points more likely in the second, with the latter estimate being 
significant at the 5% level.  The results shown above are driven primarily by preps over 
vacations, as can be seen by the stronger results in the lower panel of Table 6.  
6. The Impact of Incentives on Students
Consistent with the hypothesis that teachers responded to the program primarily by 
seeking to manipulate the variables determining prize allocation rather than by increasing efforts 
to promote long-run learning, the program had little impact on dropout and repetition rates, but 
increased student participation in exams. During the period the program was in place, student 
scores increased, significantly so on some test measures. There is some suggestive evidence that 
the effect was larger in the subjects more vulnerable to coaching. After the end of the program 
the effect on test scores did not persist. Students who had been in program schools during the 
program scored no higher than their counterparts who had been in comparison schools. Below 
we discuss the program impact on dropout and repetition (subsection 6.1), review the structure of 23
Kenyan exams (subsection 6.2), and discuss program impact on exam participation (subsection 
6.3) and test scores (subsection 6.4).
6.1 Dropout and Repetition 
As mentioned above, schools were penalized for those students who did not take the test. 
However, dropout and repetition rates in incentive schools were not significantly different from 
those in comparison schools. Dropout dummy variables were set equal to one if a student 
enrolled in the previous year did not continue schooling in the current year. Repetition dummy 
variables were set equal to one if the student repeated the same class in the following year. 
Dropout rates were insignificantly higher in treatment schools (Table 7, Columns 1 and 2), while 
the repetition rate was insignificantly lower in incentive schools (Table 7, Columns 3 and 4).
6.2 The Kenyan Exams
Incentives for teachers were based on their students’ performance on the district exams, 
which are administered in seven subjects: English, Math, Science, Swahili, Geography-History-
Christian Religion (G.H.CR.), Arts-Crafts-Music (A.C.M.), and Home Science-Business 
Education (HS.BE.) Students in grades 4 through 8 take these exams in October of each year. 
Participation is incomplete since students have to pay a fee of 120 Shillings (US $2) to 
participate in the exams. Since the rules of the incentive program stipulated that any student who 
did not take the district exams would be assigned lower scores than students could obtain by 
guessing, teachers in program schools had incentives to encourage their students to take the 
district exams.24
In addition to the district exams, students also took KCPE and ICS exams, which were 
not tied to the teacher incentive program. Thus, these tests provide us with an independent way 
to assess the impact of the program. 
The Kenyan primary school leaving exam (KCPE) is administered by the Ministry of 
Education each year to pupils completing grade 8. It determines what secondary school, if any, 
students attend. ICS also administered exams to students in grades 3 through 8.
20  In year 1, the 
ICS tests were administered in English, Math, and Science.  In years 2 and 3, they were 
administered only in English and Math.
21 We have data on the district exam scores and the 
KCPE test scores from both intervention years (1 and 2) as well as the post-program year (3). 
Finally, we have information on the ICS tests for all participating schools for both of the 
intervention years.
22 We were unable to obtain the data for comparison schools in Teso District 
for year 1. Consequently, analysis of the district exam scores for year 1 is restricted to schools in 
Busia District. 
Security is generally tight in Kenyan exams to prevent cheating.  District exams were 
supervised by three to four teachers from a neighboring school. Because the KCPE exam 
determines the future scholastic paths of the eighth grade students who take it, these exams are 
even more strictly monitored and supervised.  
In 1998, one case was identified in which the headmaster of a program school colluded 
with the teachers assigned to supervise the schools to allow cheating on the district exam. That 
                                               
20 For a complete description of the ICS tests and their administration, see Glewwe, Kremer, and Moulin (2001). 
These tests were also administered in 1996 and 1997.
21 In year 0 and year 1, all three exams were fairly similar in format and content. Separate exams were given for 
each grade and the exams had a multiple-choice format. However, the ICS exams in year 2 and 3 were "multilevel,” 
with the same test given to all students in grades 3 through 8. Easy questions in the beginning of the test could be 
answered by all students, including those in grade 3, while questions became progressively harder. The final 
questions were based on material seen only in the eighth grade. These exams also had a "fill in the blank,” as 
opposed to a multiple choice format. 25
school was disqualified from the competition in 1998 but was allowed to participate in 1999. 
The scores from that school were not included in the analysis in 1998, but their scores were 
included in 1999.
6.3 Exam Participation
Exam participation is important both as an outcome in its own right and because 
differential exam participation could complicate the interpretation of test score differences 
between program and comparison schools. Exam participation rates were higher in program 
schools than in comparison schools for the district exams (on which the incentives were based), 
but were similar between treatment and comparison schools on the ICS and KCPE exams. 
Following standard ITT methodology, we restrict attention to only those students who 
were enrolled as of February 1998 (year 1) and assign students who switched schools during the 
program to their original schools. 
Baseline participation on the district exams was around 70%; on the ICS and KCPE 
exams it was around 85%. In year 1, participation in the district exams was higher by 6.0 
percentage points in the incentive schools, a difference which is statistically significant at the 
10% level (Table 8, Column 1). By year 2, participation was higher by 10.8 percentage points in 
the treatment schools, a significant difference at the 5% level. (The main differences between 
incentive and treatment schools in exam participation were in grades 4 through 7; participation in 
grade 8 on the district exam was close to 90% prior to the program.) In the post-program year, 
when there was no longer an incentive to encourage students to take the test, the participation 
rate was actually 2.2% lower in the incentive schools than in the comparison schools, though the 
difference was not significant. In contrast, the participation rates in the ICS and KCPE exams, 
                                                                                                                                                      
22 In the post-program year, 27 of the 100 schools were involved in a de-worming project. This enabled us to collect 26
which were not linked to teacher incentives, were similar between the two school groups in 
either year (Columns 2 and 3).
Theoretically, efforts by teachers in treatment schools to increase exam participation 
could bias scores either upwards or downwards, but available evidence suggests the bias is 
likely downward. If teachers in the treatment schools put equal effort into encouraging all 
students who would not otherwise have taken the exam to do so, then the addition of marginal 
students would likely have dragged down average test scores, since poorer students are less 
likely to pay the fee to take the district exam. But if teachers selectively chose to concentrate on 
convincing potentially high-scoring students and their parents of the exam’s importance, then 
average scores in the treatment schools could be potentially biased upward. To get a sense of the 
direction of bias, we compared pre-scores of test takers in treatment and comparison schools. 
The additional students who took the tests in the incentive schools had lower pre-test scores, but 
not significantly so. 
6.4 Test Scores
Test scores on the district exam are higher in the incentive schools during the years of the 
program (significantly higher in the second year). Scores on other exams are also higher in 
program schools during the duration of the program, but not significantly higher. In the post-
program year, however, we see no persistence of the test score gains. This provides some support 
for the hypothesis that teachers are focusing primarily on extra coaching specifically for the test 
in question. On the other hand, there is little evidence of outright cheating, and we did not see 
any evidence that teaching effort actually decreased during the program, such as a decline in 
long-run test scores for students exposed to the program.
                                                                                                                                                      
ICS test score data from that subset of schools for that program year.27
We examine differences in test scores between the incentive and comparison schools 
using a random effect regression framework that allows for the possibility that scores of students 
in the same grade and same school might be correlated due to unobserved characteristics of 
teachers and headmasters. In particular, we use an error components econometric model with 
school, grade, and subject random effects: random effects at the school level and at the level of 
individual subjects and grades within the school.
(1) tijks =D4kD4i +D5kD5i +  … + D8kD8i  + Ekps + uks + vjks + eijks     
where k = English, Math, Science, Swahili, G.H.CR., A.C.M., and HS.BE.
Equation (1) combines data from several grades to measure the impact of the incentive 
program for a given subject. The test score of student i in grade j in subject k in school s is tijks. 
The dummy variables Dji indicate whether child i is in grade j. The variable ps is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if school s is an incentive school (i.e. a school which was eligible for 
teacher incentives) and 0 if not. Thus if the impact of the incentive program varies across grades, 
Ek will measure the (weighted) average impact of the program across all grades. The error term 
contains three components, the school-specific error term (for subject k), uks, a grade-specific 
term conditional on being in that school, vjks, and a child specific term, eijks.
We estimate these equations using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) without imposing a 
specific distribution (e.g. the normal distribution) on the error terms. The regressions also include 
controls for sex and geographic division within Busia. Given the prospective design of the 
program, regressions without such controls are consistent, but adding controls to the regression 
may increase the precision of the estimates. As a check, we ran regressions without the controls 
for region and sex; they yield similar results. 
Because the units in which test scores are measured are arbitrary, for each subject and 
grade combination we normalize all test scores (including district, ICS, and KCPE tests) by 28
subtracting the mean test score in the comparison schools and then dividing by the corresponding 
standard deviation for those schools. Thus, a student with a normalized score of 0.1 was 0.1 
standard deviations above the mean score in the comparison schools. Note that for a normal 
distribution, an increase of 0.1 standard deviation would move a student from the 50
th percentile 
to the 54
th. Since the district test exams were different for Busia and Teso Districts, the 
normalization of these tests was done separately for each district. 
There is no significant difference in pre-program scores on the district exam between 
incentive and comparison schools for any subject or grade.  Overall, prior to the program, 
treatment schools scored almost the same as comparison schools.  Since grade 2 students were 
not given district exams in 1996, we used 1997 ICS tests as pre-tests where available for students 
who were in grade 4 in 1998.
The difference in test scores between treatment and comparison schools, and the 
difference-in-difference estimator of the effect of the program are shown in Tables 9 (for the 
district exam) and 10 (for the ICS and KCPE exams).
23 The difference estimates were calculated 
using the full sample, i.e. all the students in grades 4 through 8 who took the exams in either 
intervention year, while the difference-in-difference estimates use a restricted sample, i.e. those 
students who took exams in at least one subject, in the pre-program year and at least one of the 
intervention years. As discussed, we restrict attention to only those students who were enrolled 
prior to the announcement of the program, as of February 1998 (year 1). We also restrict the 
sample to those students who did not repeat or dropout in any year, since students who repeated 
would be taking a different exam. 
Averaging across all subjects and grades, the difference estimate for the district exam is 
insignificantly negative in the first year of the program (point estimate –0.04), but this could 
                                               
23 Normalized district test scores from year 0 (1996) were used as the KCPE pre-program scores, since the KCPE 
exam is taken by grade 8 students only.29
potentially be due to the differential exam participation between treatment and comparison 
schools on the district exams. The difference-in-difference estimate is positive, although not 
significant. Both the difference and difference-in-difference estimate of the treatment effect in 
year 2 are significantly positive at 0.136 and 0.139 respectively. For the ICS exams, differences 
are not significant in either year, and the point estimates across years are similar, at around 0.085 
(Table 10, Panel A). For the KCPE, the overall difference estimate in year 1 is 0.138 and the 
difference-in-difference is 0.104, with the former being significant at the 5% level (Table 10, 
Panel B). In year 2, the effect is stronger, with the difference estimate equal to 0.165, significant 
at the 5% level. 
By year 3, students in the incentive schools had been exposed to the program for all of 
year 1 and year 2. If the increases in test scores in year 1 and year 2 of the program were due to 
increases in students’ underlying long-term learning, then students in incentive schools should 
also have scored higher in year 3, after the program ended. However, estimates of the program 
effect in year 3 on the district and KCPE exams were close to zero.
24
Since the teacher incentives were based on performance on the district tests only, data on 
ICS and KCPE tests can be used to check whether the difference in student outcomes between 
the incentive and comparison schools was due to factors specific to the district exams, such as 
outright cheating or altering the pool of students taking the test. Program schools scored 
insignificantly higher on the ICS test (Table 10, Panel A), and significantly higher on the KCPE 
(Table 10, Panel B) in both program years. 
Breaking down the results by subject, the average effect for the two program years was 
strongest for the subject test on Geography, History, and Christian Religion, which is arguably 
the subject that involves the most memorization (Tables 9 and 10). In year 1, the difference-in-
                                               
24 Data for the ICS exams in year 3 was only available for 27 of the schools – those that participated in a de-
worming project that year. Point estimates are positive, but t-statistics are less than or equal to one.30
difference estimate on G.H.CR was 0.205 for the district exam and 0.149 for the KCPE exam, 
with the former being significant at the 10% level. In year 2, the program impact on G.H.CR. 
scores is even stronger, with the difference-in-difference estimates being 0.341 for the District 
Exams and 0.336 for the KCPE exams. Both estimates are significant at the 5% level. The next 
biggest effects were for science and math, with no significant effect for other subjects. Arguably, 
GHCR is the subject with most memorization and is particularly susceptible to extra-coaching 
and short-run teaching strategies. Primary school science also involves a fair amount of 
memorization, but math presumably requires less memorization. 
25
For the 1999 ICS test, we have item-level data on whether students had correct answers 
to individual questions in their English and math tests.  Treatment students scored higher than 
comparison students on the later part of the test but not on the early part of the test. This may be 
because teachers in treatment schools taught students to better allocate time across sections of the 
test.  (However, given that both tests were designed so as to increase in difficulty as the test 
progressed, another possibility is that the program induced increased teaching effort, but that this 
was most effective at raising scores on more difficult questions.)  
Analysis of the item responses to detect cheating using techniques developed by Jacob 
and Levitt (2002) provide little evidence of suspicious strings of questions for which all students 
in the class got the question right, suggesting cheating was not widespread, although there was 
one instance in which cheating was discovered at a program school.  Were cheating widespread 
we likely would have seen much larger test score differentials on the district exam (on which 
incentives were based) than on other exams.  Although the estimated program impact on the 
                                               
25 ICS staff members familiar with the curriculum suggested that G.H.CR and HS.BE. require the most 
memorization, science requires a medium amount of memorization and English, Math and Swahili require the most 
creative thinking. 31
district exam is somewhat larger than on the ICS exams, it is lower than on the heavily-
monitored KCPE exams, suggesting that cheating was not the main source of the program effect.
7. Time-path of Changes in Teacher Behavior 
There is evidence that teachers learned over time how better to take advantage of the 
program. Estimated differences in preparation sessions between treatment and comparison 
schools grew between the first and second year. Anecdotal evidence from the first year’s prize 
award ceremonies suggests that prior to these ceremonies some teachers did not fully understand 
that having students drop out or not take the test would reduce their chances of receiving a prize. 
After this experience, differences in exam participation rates between program and comparison 
schools rose presumably because teachers worked harder to persuade students to take the exam.  
The test score gap between treatment and comparison schools was greater in the second year 
than in the first year. 
8. Conclusion
Students in schools with a teacher incentive program in were more likely to take exams 
and had higher test scores in the short run. There is little evidence, however, that teachers 
responded to the program by taking steps to reduce dropouts or increasing effort on stimulating 
long-run learning.  Teachers in program schools had no higher attendance rates or homework 
assignment rates.  Pedagogy and student dropout rates were similar across schools.  Instead, 
teachers in program schools increased test preparation activities and encouraged students 
enrolled in school to take the test.  Following the end of the program, the test score difference 
between students who had attended treatment and comparison schools disappeared, consistent 
with a model in which teachers increased signaling effort but did not significantly increase effort 32
to promote long-run learning.  Similarly, dropout rates were no lower in program schools, but 
conditional on being enrolled in school, students were more likely to take exams linked to 
incentives.
It is worth noting several caveats (as well as caveats to these caveats). First, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that a larger incentive program or teacher-specific incentives would have 
induced not only increased test preparation, but also increased effort to improve underlying 
learning. However, at up to 40% of monthly income, the incentives were comparable in 
magnitude to those in most U.S. programs. Although the bonuses were a small percentage of 
yearly salary so the implied increase in daily wages was modest, if teachers chose attendance 
optimally prior to the program given their intrinsic motivation to teach, other incentives implicit 
in the system, and their value of time in other activities, they should have been indifferent at the 
margin to small changes in attendance, and hence modest incentives could potentially have had a 
substantial effect. Moreover, while larger incentives might induce more effort by teachers, they 
could also have induced effort at counter-productive signaling, for example through cheating on 
tests or forcing weak students to drop out. They would also force teachers to bear more risk. 
Some argue that individual-level incentives for teachers could potentially undermine cooperation 
within the school. 
A second caveat is that incentives may work as much by encouraging people who will be 
good teachers to enter the profession as by eliciting higher effort from those who would become 
teachers  in any case.  However, given the queuing for teaching positions in Kenya, it is unlikely 
that people who either already have teaching jobs or who have the academic qualifications to 
enter teacher training colleges (but not universities) will select out of the profession. Any effect 
on this margin in Kenya and other developing countries with queues for teaching jobs is 
therefore likely to be small.33
Third, the program was explicitly temporary. If teachers expected the program to 
continue indefinitely, and if they expected to remain at the schools for many years, they would 
have had more incentive to make long-run investments in learning.
26 On the other hand, because 
the program was temporary it was possible to base incentives on improvements over baseline 
performance, to incorporate incentives to prevent students from dropping out, and to restrict the 
program to teachers already in school and thus to avoid strengthening incentives for teachers to 
seek transfers to schools with pupils from more advantaged backgrounds.  A program without 
these features would be much less attractive since it would be difficult to provide incentives to 
teachers in weak schools, to prevent teachers from trying to influence the pool of pupils entering 
their school, or to avoid increasing incentives for good teachers to try to transfer to the best 
schools.  
Fourth, teachers in program schools may have exerted little effort because they believed 
that the test was such that learning has only a small impact on test scores. Alternative tests that 
better measure long-run learning might potentially create better incentives. However, since the 
incentives provided by ICS were based on the official government of Kenya exams, which in 
turn are based on the official curriculum, any incentive program based around these exams is 
likely to run into similar difficulties. 
However, whatever the problems with teacher incentives, the status quo - with its 20% 
teacher absence rate - is inadequate, so it seems worth exploring other alternatives. 
One strategy for improving incentives would be to attach incentives to measurable inputs, 
such as teacher attendance. In many countries, teachers’ pay is not linked to pupils' test scores, 
but a teacher who is absent 20% of the time would typically face some sort of disciplinary 
sanction. One problem with this approach is that attaching incentives to inputs rather than 
                                               
26 In practice, many teachers transfer between schools.34
outputs can lead to undersupply of badly measured inputs. For example, since random audits can 
verify whether a teacher is in school, but not whether a teacher is in class, teachers might come 
to school, but not come to class, since outside inspectors cannot easily monitor presence in class.
While it would be prohibitively expensive for outside inspectors to visit schools regularly 
enough to keep track of teachers’ presence for incentive purposes, headmasters could keep these 
records. However, headmasters do not currently have incentives to risk getting into a 
confrontation with teachers over absences.  One indication of this comes from an evaluation of 
the program the NGO implemented at pre-schools.  (Preschool teachers are not formal Ministry 
of Education employees, but instead are locally hired and paid by parents.)  In this program, 
school committees were given funds with which to provide bonuses to pre-school teachers, 
conditional on their not missing more than a specified number of days of class. If the funds were 
not spent on the teachers, school committees could use them for other pre-school purposes, so 
headmasters and school committees arguably had a strong incentive to monitor pre-school 
teachers. Preliminary work suggests that the program yielded little if any improvement in 
absence rates, and it is clear that headmasters did not strictly enforce the rules requiring teacher 
attendance as a condition of the bonus being provided. More broadly, headmasters are already 
required to keep log books of teacher attendance, and inspectors are supposed to monitor them 
but log books are often not even filled out. 
Ultimately, an analysis of the problem must turn to the political economy of education.
Given that Kenya’s centralized education system is not producing adequate incentives, it may be 
worth considering decentralizing control over teachers to local school committees or allowing 
parents to choose schools and tying school finance more tightly to their decisions.
27
                                               
27 Since students’ placement in secondary school depends on performance on the primary-school leaving exam, 
local communities and parents would share some of the same incentives to focus on test preparation as teachers (see 
Acemoglu, Kremer, and Mian 2002). Nonetheless, since teachers transfer schools fairly frequently, they likely have 
greater incentives than parents to focus on the short run.35
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Table 1: Concentration of Teacher Absences
Share of teachers Attendance Probability % of Total Absence From 
This Group




















































0 < p  < 0.5
0.51 < p< 0.6
0.61 < p < 0.7
0.71 < p < 0.8
0.81 < p < 0.9







Table 2: Program Effect on Teacher Entry and Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent 
Variable:
Exit Current School (0/1) Enter New School (0/1)
Exit in 1997 Exit in 1998 Enter in 1998 Enter in 1999
0.041 0.007 0.026 -0.002 Incentive 
School (0.033) (0.026) (0.030) (0.034)
Male 0.047 0.020 0.043 -0.092
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035)**
Constant 0.137 0.209 0.190 0.234
(0.024)** (0.019)** (0.022)** (0.025)**
Observations 1157 1227 1227 1228
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses; regressions include school-level random effects.
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
For exit regressions, incentive/non-incentive refers to the originating school; for entry regressions incentive/non-
incentive refers to the destination school.  The unit of observation in all regressions is the teacher.  39
Table 3: Program Effect on Teacher Attendance





(Attendance program year –
 Attendance pre-program year)
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 - Year 0 Year 2 – Year 0
0.012 -0.008 -0.011 -0.007 -0.063 Incentive 
School (0.043) (0.019) (0.022) (0.048) (0.049)
-0.005 -0.010 0.000 -0.009 0.002 Grade
(0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016)
0.015 0.007 -0.108 -0.028 -0.095 Male (0/1)
(0.045) (0.022) (0.025)** (0.053) (0.055)*
0.828 0.882 0.904 0.049 0.064 Constant
(0.073)** (0.044)** (0.049)** (0.090) (0.094)
Observations 466 397 320 396 319
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses; regressions include school-level random effects.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%
The dependent variable is the percentage of the visits for which the teacher was present, based on up to two visits in 
1997, five visits in 1998 and three visits in 1999.  The unit of observation is the teacher.  40
Table 4:  Program Effect on Homework Assignment





(Homework program year –
 Homework pre-program year)

































Observations 1914 1676 2371 431 427
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses; regressions include school-level random effects.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
In columns 1 through 3 each observation represents a student asked about homework assignment in the previous 
day; in columns 4 and 5 differences across years are calculated at the school-grade level.41
Table 5: Program Effects on Pedagogy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year 0 Year 1  Year 2 Year 1 - Year 0 Year 2 – Year 0
Panel A
Dependent Variable: Use of Blackboard (0/1)
0.018 -0.032 0.038 -0.051 0.078 Incentive 
School (0.031) (0.026) (0.051) (0.036) (0.069)
0.010 -0.003 -0.018 -0.001 -0.029 Grade
(0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022)
0.875 0.973 0.989 0.021 0.098 Constant
(0.054)** (0.044)** (0.084)** (0.085) (0.133)
Observations 404 598 237 246 149
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Use Teaching Aid (0/1)
-0.026 -0.006 0.012 0.025 0.052 Incentive 
School (0.032) (0.031) (0.035) (0.052) (0.067)
Grade -0.021 -0.006 -0.004 -0.016 0.002
(0.012)* (0.009) (0.013) (0.021) (0.025)
Constant 0.235 0.143 0.094 0.093 -0.040
(0.073)** (0.059)** (0.080) (0.124) (0.151)
Observations 399 567 235 241 147
Panel C
Dependent Variable: Teacher Caring
(1 to 5: 1=very caring)
-0.080 -0.065 -0.051 0.052 -0.058 Incentive 
School (0.104) (0.062) (0.125) (0.133) (0.178)
0.018 -0.010 0.125 -0.025 0.093 Grade
(0.034) (0.022) (0.031)** (0.048) (0.062)
1.586 1.701 1.184 0.122 -0.280 Constant
(0.204)** (0.135)** (0.205)** (0.292) (0.375)
Observations 382 571 234 238 146
Panel D
Dependent Variable: Teacher Energy
(1 to 5: 1=energetic)
-0.030 -0.041 0.164 0.050 0.070 Incentive 
School (0.096) (0.080) (0.120) (0.167) (0.195)
-0.023 -0.019 0.070 -0.017 0.092 Grade
(0.035) (0.023) (0.027)** (0.052) (0.062)
1.926 1.870 1.126 0.073 -0.798 Constant
(0.211)** (0.146)** (0.180)** (0.324) (0.377)**
Observations  383 570 233 239 146
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses; regressions include school-level random effects.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.
Each observation in columns 1 through 3 represents a classroom; differences in columns 4 and 5 are calculated at the 
school-grade level. There are fewer observations in 1999 because only one class per school/grade was observed that 
year.42
Table 6:  Program Effect on Preparations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent 
Variable:
Preparations (0/1) Preparation Differences
(Preparation program year –
 Preparation pre-program year)
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 - Year 0 Year 2 – Year 0
Preparations (Vacation and During School)
Incentive School -0.007 0.042 0.074 0.049 0.081
(0.044) (0.037) (0.034)** (0.042) (0.047)*
Grade 0.155 0.135 0.103 -0.021 -0.052
(0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)** (0.009)***
August Holiday 
(0/1)
-0.020 0.058 -0.122 0.078 -0.102
(0.016) (0.030)* (0.034)*** (0.037)** (0.036)***
December 
Holiday (0/1)
-0.370 -0.452 -0.534 -0.082 -0.164
(0.025)*** (0.029)*** (0.030)*** (0.031)** (0.036)***
Term Visit 1 
(0/1)
0.094 0.126 0.130 0.032 0.036
(0.035)*** (0.040)*** (0.038)*** (0.035) (0.052)
Term Visit 2 
(0/1)
0.094 0.168 0.282 0.074 0.188
(0.035)*** (0.041)*** (0.040)*** (0.052) (0.052)***
Term Visit 3 
(0/1)
0.096 0.158 0.242 0.062 0.146
(0.035)*** (0.040)*** (0.043)*** (0.051) (0.055)***
Constant -0.502 -0.372 -0.121 0.130 0.381
(0.064)*** (0.053)*** (0.052)** (0.064)** (0.064)***
Observations 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000
Vacation Preparations
Incentive School 0.035 0.089 0.091 0.055 0.056
(0.034) (0.031)*** (0.035)** (0.038) (0.046)
Grade 0.156 0.139 0.118 -0.017 -0.038
(0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)* (0.009)***
August Holiday 
(0/1)
-0.020 0.058 -0.122 0.078 -0.102
(0.016) (0.030)* (0.034)*** (0.037)** (0.036)***
December 
Holiday (0/1)
-0.370 -0.452 -0.534 -0.082 -0.164
(0.025)*** (0.029)*** (0.030)*** (0.031)** (0.036)***
Constant -0.527 -0.425 -0.219 0.103 0.308
(0.049)*** (0.049)*** (0.054)*** (0.057)* (0.059)***
Observations 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses; regressions include school-level random effects. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%;
Preparations are reported at 6 times during the year for each grade: 3 vacation terms and three periods during the 
year; each observation represents a school grade at a given time during the year.  Rates for given time periods are 
reported compared to the omitted time period, the April holiday.43
Table 7: Program Effect on Dropout and Repetition Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 1 Year 2
Dropout Repetition Dropout Repetition
Incentive School 0.004 -0.012 0.002 -0.010
(0.010) (0.019) (0.015) (0.026)
Male (0/1) 0.021 0.010 0.018 -0.009
(0.005)** (0.008) (0.005)** (0.008)
Constant 0.073 0.295 0.116 0.256
(0.007)** (0.014)** (0.011)** (0.018)**
Observations 14153 12686 14545 12671
Notes: 
Standard errors in parentheses; regressions include school-level random effects. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
Each observation represents an upper primary school student.44
Table 8: Program Effects on Participation in Exams
(1) (2) (3)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
(Post-Program)
Panel A
Dependent Variable: Take District Exam (0/1)
Incentive School 0.060 0.108 -0.022
(0.033)* (0.028)** (0.034)
Male (0/1) 0.015 -0.011 0.007
(0.008)* (0.009) (0.016)
Grade 0.058 0.036 0.010
(0.003)** (0.004)** (0.010)
Constant 0.389 0.525 0.560
(0.029)** (0.034)** (0.069)**
Observations 10690 7158 3642
Panel B
Dependent Variable: Take ICS Exam (0/1)
Incentive School 0.005 0.031
(0.007) (0.024)








Dependent Variable: Take KCPE Exam (0/1)
Incentive School -0.014 0.026 0.021
(0.047) (0.017) (0.039)
Male (0/1) -0.000 0.001 0.013
(0.019) (0.015) (0.029)
Constant 0.779 0.912 0.813
(0.034)** (0.014)** (0.029)**
Observations 1624 1265 681
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; school-level random effects included.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
District test data was not available for Teso District in 1998. 
ITT methodology employed.
Each observation represents an upper primary school pupil in year 0; columns 2 and 3 are limited to pupils who did 
not repeat or drop out in any year. 45
Table 9:  Program Effect on Test Scores by Subject (District Exam)




(Standardized relative to 
comparison schools)
Test Score Differences
Test Scoreprogram year –
Test Scorepre-program year








































































































Observations 50,842 37,620 15,893 24,677 15,641 5,330
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; regressions include school-level random effects.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
Year 1 district test results are available only for Busia
Each row represents a random effects regression of test scores on a dummy variable for teacher incentive schools 
and on region and sex dummy variables, based on data on the 100 schools in Teso and Busia Districts. For each 
grade/subject combination, test scores were standardized by subtracting the mean score and dividing by the standard 
deviation of the test score from the comparison schools.
Each observation represents a test score in a particular subject for an upper primary school pupil; columns 2 and 3 
are limited to pupils who were enrolled in year 1 and did not repeat or drop out. Columns 4, 5, 6 impose the 
additional restriction that a pre-test score is available.
7,848 students (grades 4 to 8) took at least one district exam in year 1. Of these, 5,751 had pre-test scores from a 
pre-program year, in this case 1996. In year 2, when exam results are also available for Teso, 10,927 students (grade 
4 to 8) took at least one exam and 6,365 of these students also had pre-test scores from the same pre-program year. 
In the post-program year, 9,613 students (grade 4 to 8) took at least one exam and 4,016 of these had pre-test scores. 
In later years more students have no pre-test scores because students who enter the sample (by reaching 4
th grade) 
after the first year will not have pre-test scores. So, for example, in the post-program year students in 4
th and 5
th
grade will not have pre-test scores.  46
Table 10:  Program Effect on Test Scores by Subject (Non-Incentive Tests)















































Observations 39,510 12,996 32,993 10,512
Panel B



































































































Observations 10,430 8,427 4,053  7,152 5,247 1,505
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis; regressions include school-level random effects.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
Year 3 ICS tests were given only in 27 schools so scores are not reported; KCPE tests are taken by grade 8 students 
only. Each row represents a random effects regression of test scores on a dummy variable for teacher incentive 
schools and on region and sex dummy variables, based on data on the 100 schools in Teso and Busia Districts. For 
each grade/subject combination, test scores were standardized by subtracting the mean score and dividing by the 
standard deviation of the test score from the comparison schools.
Each observation represents a test score in a particular subject for an upper primary school pupil; columns 2 and 3 
are limited to pupils who were enrolled in year 1 and did not repeat or drop out.  Columns 4, 5, and 6 impose the 
additional restriction that a pre-test score is available.
13,339 students (grades 4 to 8) took at least one subject of the ICS exams in year 1. Of these, 11,298 had pre-test 
scores from year 0, in the form of normalized district exam scores from year 0. 15,647 students took at least one ICS 
exam in year 2, of which 8,638 had pre-test scores from year 0.  1,490 eight graders took at least one KCPE exam in 
year 1, of which 1,026 had pre-test scores from year 0. 1,584 students took at least once KCPE exam in year 2, of 
which 944 had pre-test scores.1,537 students took at least one KCPE exam in year 3, of which 839 had pre-test 
scores. 47
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